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IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
I. INTRODUCTION
When a patent is granted, it includes claims to certain subject matter
which define the scope of the patentee's invention and hence the scope of the
monopoly granted to the patentee.' The patent's claims are the product of a
give-and-take process. The applicant submits his claims to the scrutiny of the
patent examiner. Initially, this examiner is likely to reject the claims or to
impose additional requirements on the applicant. Once approved, the claims
are the product of the exercise of specialized knowledge by the applicant and
the examiner. If the process works correctly, the claims are the best expression
of the applicant's invention. In large measure, the claims distinguish the pat-
entee's invention from those already in the public domain or incorporated in a
previously issued patent. The claims define the boundaries of the patentee's
monopoly, and those who violate those boundaries are subject to an action for
infringement.
Given that the patent's claims define the patentee's monopoly rights to
the patent,2 one would expect an infringement action to consist of a compari-
son of all or part of the allegedly infringing device or process to the patent
claims. If the language of the claims does not cover the defendant's device or
process, then no infringement is found. However, despite uniform agreement
as to this rule, courts have not limited the patentee's protection to the literal
language of the claims. As Judge Learned Hand explained, "after all aids to
interpretation have been exhausted, and the scope of the claims has been en-
larged as far as the words can be stretched, on proper occasions courts make
them cover more than their meaning will bear."'
1. Autogiro Co. v. United States, 181 Ct. Cl. 55, 60, 384 F.2d 391, 395-96
(1967) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1982): "The specification shall conclude with one or
more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which
the applicant regards as his invention."); accord Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Re-
placement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 339 (1961); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air
Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950); Technitrol, Inc., v. Control Data Corp., 550
F.2d 992, 998 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977); Rosen v. Kahlenberg, 474
F.2d 858, 860 (5th Cir. 1973); Burgess & Assocs., Inc. v. Klingensmith, 487 F.2d 321,
324 (9th Cir. 1973); Imperial Stone Cutters, Inc. v. Schwartz, 370 F.2d 425, 427 (8th
Cir. 1966); Keating v. Stearnes Imperial Co., 347 F.2d 444, 447 (7th Cir. 1965); Mc-
Cullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc., 343 F.2d 381, 402-03 (10th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 933 (1966), Reiner v. I. Leon Co., 324 F.2d 648, 651 (2d Cir. 1963);
Plax Corp. v. Precision Extruders, Inc., 239 F.2d 792, 795 (3d Cir. 1957).
2. This rule has been embraced by numerous courts. See supra note 1.
3. Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 168 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir.),
1
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In so stating, Judge Hand was referring to the equitable doctrine of
equivalents. Before moving to an analysis of what constitutes a proper occa-
sion for application of the doctrine, an understanding of its basic nature is
necessary. The doctrine of equivalents provides that an accused device or pro-
cess, although different from the patentee's invention as described in the
claims, still may be found to infringe "if it performs substantially the same
function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result."'4 "The doc-
trine of equivalents is designed to protect inventors from unscrupulous copy-
ists, and unanticipated equivalents." 5
The doctrine has undergone a long evolution. Before the Patent Act of
1870, the common practice was to claim the invention in general terms' after
describing it in the specifications.7 The description of the invention was, as it is
under the present law,8 distinguished from the claims of the invention.9 An
infringement action consisted of a comparison of the patented device with the
allegedly infringing device, and it was not possible for the defendant to prevent
a finding of infringement by substituting "'well known equivalents.' "10 Given
the lack of expert guidance as to what characteristics of the invention made it
patentable, courts had considerable discretion in the infringement determina-
tion. This discretion was reduced somewhat by the enactment of the Patent
Act of 1870. According to Chisum, "[a]fter the Patent Act of 1870, the Su-
preme Court placed increased emphasis on the language of the claims as the
measure of the exclusive rights granted by a patent."'1 Nevertheless, the doc-
trine of equivalents survived this transition and certain refinements were intro-
duced. Significantly, the range of equivalents came to depend upon "the de-
gree of invention."12 The range of equivalents protected by the patent is
largest when the patent defines a new area of inventive art (pioneer patent), 13
and smallest when the patent is an improvement in an art crowded with previ-
cert. denied, 335 U.S. 825 (1948).
4. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950)
(quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929) (quoting Union
Paper Bag Mach. Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1877))).
5. Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 389 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1004 (1985) (citations omitted).
6. The law today requires the claims to "particularly point[] out and distinctly
claim[]" what has been invented. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1982).
7. 4 D. CHISUM, PATENTS § 18.02[1] (1987).
8. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1982).
9. The former serves the purpose of disclosure such that a person with skill in the
art could "make and use" the invention. Id. The latter points out what it is about the
invention that distinguishes it from what has come before it, makes it useful and not
obvious in light of the prior art.
10. 4 D. Chisum, PATENTS § 18.02[l] (1987).
11. Id. § 18.02[2].
12. Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 415
(1908) (citations omitted).
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ously issued patents.1 4 Those inventions falling within an art not characterized
by either extreme are entitled to "some range of equivalents."15
The doctrine of equivalents carves one exception to the general rule that
the claims define the scope of the invention. Another, albeit less dramatic,
modification of the rule focuses on to the prosecution history of the patent
claims. Every patent allowed in this country leaves in its wake a paper trail
recording the prosecution history of the patent:
The prosecution history . . . of the patent consists of the entire record of
proceedings in the Patent and Trademark Office. This includes all express
representations made by or on behalf of the applicant to the examiner to in-
duce a patent grant . . . . Such representations include amendments to the
claims and arguments made to convince the examiner that the claimed inven-
tion meets the statutory requirements of novelty, utility and nonobviousness.' 6
Courts use the prosecution history to interpret the claims of the patent. One
aspect of this interpretive function is that it precludes the patentee from re-
ceiving a construction of the claim which, as revealed in the prosecution his-
tory, he surrendered during prosecution in order to get the claim allowed. 17
Similarly, the patentee may not resort to the doctrine of equivalents to "resur-
rect subject matter surrendered during prosecution of his patent applica-
tion."' 8 This limitation on the doctrine of equivalents is called prosecution his-
tory estoppel.'9 It should be distinguished from the use of prosecution history
to interpret the literal language of the patent claims.' 0 While the doctrine of
prosecution history estoppel is simply stated; the simplicity of such statement
belies the great difficulty in applying the doctrine to a given set of facts.
The regional circuit courts have adopted different, and often conflicting,
views of prosecution history estoppel." However, since the Federal Courts Im-
14. Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 389 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1004 (1985); see Brill v. Washington Ry. & Elee. Co., 215 U.S. 527 (1910).
15. Cimiotti Unhairing Co. v. American Fur Ref. Co., 198 U.S. 399, 408-09
(1905).
16. Standard Oil Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 452 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
17. Id.; see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 33 (1966).
18. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Unites States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
19. Frequently referred to as "file wrapper estoppel."
20. "Interpreting claims in view of the prosecution history applies as a prelimi-
nary step in determining literal infringement. Prosecution history estoppel applies as a
limitation to the doctrine of equivalents after the claims have been properly interpreted
and no literal infringement is found." Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861,
870-71 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citation omitted). There is, then, at least a procedural differ-
ence between the two uses of prosecution history.
21. Compare New York Scaffolding Co. v. Whitney, 224 F. 452, 462 (8th Cir.
1915) with Ekco Prods. Co., v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 347 F.2d 453, 454 (7th Cir.
1965). According to Whitney, prosecution history estoppel can have practically no ef-
fect in that the patentee is allowed to claim every patentable improvement not covered
by the prior art references. In Ekco, the court looks merely to see that the element of
the allegedly infringed device was amended during prosecution and then bars any re-
1988]
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provement Act of 1982,22 the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
handled all appeals of patent cases from the district courts.23 Therefore, the
discussion will focus on the fate of prosecution history estoppel in the Federal
Circuit. But, given the doctrine's long history of use in the regional circuit
courts as well as the importance of Supreme Court pronouncements, cases not
decided by the Federal Circuit merit discussion.
The predominance of the Federal Circuit in patent appeals gives rise to
the opportunity for nationwide uniformity in patent law generally and prosecu-
tion history estoppel specifically. However, different panels of the Federal Cir-
cuit have apparently adopted divergent approaches to the application of prose-
cution history estoppel. One approach, represented by Kinzenbaw v. Deere &
Co.2 and its progeny, applies prosecution history estoppel broadly to limit the
use of the doctrine of equivalents. Generally, courts adopting a broad applica-
tion prosecution history estoppel are unwilling to look behind the finding in
the prosecution history that a claim was amended or otherwise limited to de-
termine if the claim may yet have some range of equivalents. Other panels
have applied prosecution history estoppel narrowly. This approach is adopted
in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States25 and its progeny. Such courts have
been willing to judge for themselves the specific limitations a particular
amendment has on the available equivalents of the claim. But courts, which
are in the business of deciding real cases and not writing law review articles,
practically never adopt either the broad or narrow approach in a pure form.
To the extent distinct approaches have developed, their legal and equitable
underpinnings will be spotlighted in an effort to isolate those criteria which
provide the most sound basis for the application of prosecution history estop-
pel. In this vein, the sections that follow will examine the broad and narrow
application of prosecution history estoppel.
II. BROAD APPLICATION
The leading case in the Federal Circuit which applied broad application
prosecution history estoppel is Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co..26 The patents alleg-
course to the doctrine of equivalents, which gives prosecution history estoppel a large
effect.
22. Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (codified in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C. (1982)).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (1982).
24. 741 F.2d 383 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
25. 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
26. 741 F.2d 383 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Kinzenbaw has been contrasted in Federal
Circuit cases following narrow application of prosecution history estoppel. See Moeller
v. Ionetics, Inc., 794 F.2d 653, 659 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd.,
781 F.2d 861, 871 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1985). It has also been referred to as the leading case
for the broad application approach in a recent law review article. See Strawbridge,
McDonald & Moy, Patent Law Developments in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit for 1986, 36 AM. U.L. REv. 861, 887-89 (1987).
[Vol. 53
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edly infringed upon in Kinzenbaw were for elements of a row planter. One of
those elements was the apparatus for cutting a furrow in which the seeds
would be placed. This apparatus consisted of two discs "substantially contact-
ing at their point of entry into the ground and diverging apart rearwardly and
upwardly relative to the direction of travel, [and] a pair of depth gauge com-
pacting wheels in face contact with the outer surfaces of said discs .... ,,17
The gauge wheels controlled the depth to which the discs cut. The patented
configuration improved upon prior designs by placing the gauge wheels in con-
tact with the rearward surface of the discs. This allowed the gauge wheels to
scrape off any soil which might cling to the discs, and also compacted the soil
in the furrow wall.28
Initially, Deere's patent claim said that the gauge wheels were to extend
"beyond the peripheries of the discs which they contract rearwardly of the
axes of said [gauge] wheels relative to the direction of travel."2 9 The examiner
rejected the claim as obvious in light of the prior art. In response to this rejec-
tion, Deere amended his claim to define more specifically the dimension of the
gauge wheel. The amended claim stated that the radius of the gauge wheel
was to be greater than the distance from the axes of the wheel to the rear edge
of the discs and that the radius of the wheel was less than the radius of the
discs.30 The examiner approved the claim as modified. The allegedly infringing
device had a gauge wheel with a radius greater than the radius of the discs.
Therefore, the court concluded that there could not be literal infringement.31
Deere contended that the doctrine of equivalents applied, and the accused
device was an infringement of Deere's patent despite the finding of no literal
infringement. The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that Deere
could not take advantage of the doctrine of equivalents in this situation be-
cause of prosecution history estoppel.32 The estoppel arose because the appli-
cant had, in response to a rejection of his original claim, amended his claim to
specify that the radius of the gauge wheel was to be less than the radius of the
discs. Deere argued that prosecution history estoppel should not be applied
because the part of the amendment which limited the radius of the gauge
wheel to a length less than the radius of the discs was not required in order to
overcome prior art.33 The court "decline[d] to undertake the speculative in-
quiry whether [if the claim had not been amended to limit the radius of the
gauge wheel to less than that of the discs] the examiner nevertheless would
have allowed it." 34 The court reasoned that the file containing the prosecution
27. Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 388 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
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history of the patent showed that Deere had limited the claim by an amend-
ment which had the "stated purpose" of overcoming the examiner's rejec-
tion. 35 Further, the file was open to the public and thus a manufacturer would
be justified in assuming that a device having gauge wheels with radii greater
than that of the discs would not infringe the patent.36 The court's refusal to
evaluate the necessity of the specification of the gauge wheel radius to patent-
ability characterizes a broad application of prosecution history estoppel. The
court determined that the claim had been narrowed in response to an objection
by the examiner in view of prior art. In that event, the court treated the nar-
rowed elements of the amended claim as material to its allowance.
37
There are common elements in cases which have followed the Kinzenbaw
approach to prosecution history estoppel. In Kinzenbaw, the court supported
its application of prosecution history estoppel by noting that the prosecution
history was a public record and the manufacturers were justified in relying on
the claim limitations therein.3 8 In Prodyne Enterprises, Inc. v. Julie Poner-
antz, Inc.,39 the court refused the plaintiff's invitation to determine whether
the limiting amendment was necessary to avoid the reference cited by the ex-
aminer during prosecution.40 Explaining the reasoning behind their decision,
Judge Rich wrote that the plaintiff "is estopped from . . . broadening the
description of a claim element limited during prosecution so as to encompass a
structure which a competitor should reasonably be entitled to believe is not
within the legal boundaries of the patent claims in suit."'4 1 A First Circuit
panel, in a case prior to the establishment of the Federal Circuit, stated that it
would not examine the reasons behind a limiting amendment to a claim before
applying prosecution history estoppel.4 2 The court explained this decision by
noting, "[T]o a party examining the [prosecution history] file to determine the
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. This important step in the analysis is implicit in Kinzenbaw, but the Supreme
Court has stated:
The applicant having limited his claim by amendment and accepted a patent,
brings himself within the rules that if the claim to a combination be restricted
to specified elements, all must be regarded as material, and that limitations
imposed by the inventor, especially such as were introduced into an applica-
tion after it had been persistently rejected, must be strictly construed against
the inventor and looked upon as disclaimers.
Smith v. Magic City Kennel Club, 282 U.S. 784, 790 (1931) (citations omitted).
38. Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 389 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1004 (1985).
39. 743 F.2d 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
40. Id. at 1583. The court cited Kinzenbaw as authority.
41. Id. (emphasis in original).
42. Borg-Warner Corp. v. Paragon Gear Works, Inc., 355 F.2d 400, 406 (1st
Cir. 1965). However, the court ultimately determined that the amendment was not for
the purpose of limiting the submitted claim and did not apply prosecution history es-
toppel. See id. How this cannot be called examining the reasons behind an amendment
is difficult to understand.
[Vol. 53
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true scope of what has been granted, and finding something affirmatively dis-
claimed, it should make no difference what was the purpose of the
disclaimer." 43
The common rationale in each of the these cases for a broad application
of prosecution history estoppel is an estoppel argument.4 Courts refuse to use
the doctrine of equivalents to expand the scope of the patent beyond that given
by its literal language, because the public is allowed to rely on the limitations
the inventor places on the scope of his monopoly which are part of the public
record.
Another justification for the broad application of prosecution history es-
toppel is found in Nationwide Chemical Corp. v. Wright,45 decided by the
Fifth Circuit. The court speculated that the examiner might have allowed the
plaintiff's claim if it had been written more broadly. The court concluded,
however, that the problem with attempting to ascertain the necessity of the
amendment exactly as written "is that it would cause us to place ourselves in
the Examiner's place, and either guess what he would have allowed if faced
with the question, or substitute our judgment for that of the Examiner, who is
the expert in this field."146 To the court in Nationwide, prosecution history es-
toppel is an expression of judicial deference to the determination of the exam-
iner and the patentee as to what was necessary to secure claim patentability
over prior art, especially when that particular claim was in dispute during
prosecution.
III. NARROW APPLICATION
The forebearer of the narrow application approach in the Federal Circuit
is Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States.17 In that case, the plaintiff conceded
that there was no literal infringement and sought a finding of infringement
solely on the basis of the doctrine of equivalents.4 8 The court, in discussing
prosecution history estoppel, stated that some courts had held that "virtually
any amendment of the claims" barred application of the doctrine of
43. Id. at 406.
44. While it is hardly surprising that a doctrine called "prosecution history es-
toppel" has its legal basis in the concept of estoppel, there is considerable question as to
whether the doctrine in fact is an estoppel concept. See infra text accompanying notes
118-22.
45. 584 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1978). The plaintiff's patented method of applying its
chemical to citrus trees called for a dosage of less than four ounces per acre. The prior
art reference had stipulated a dosage of 48 ounces per acre. The defendant's method
required that "greater than four ounces per acre" be applied. The court held that
plaintiff was estopped to broaden the scope of his claim beyond the literal language of
"less than four ounces per acre" by the doctrine of equivalents. Id. at 716.
46. Id. at 718.
47. 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
48. Id. at 1361.
1988]
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equivalents.4 9 The court rejected this use of prosecution history estoppel as
"wooden" and as "negating entirely the doctrine of equivalents." 50 It reasoned
that the:
[a]mendment of claims is a common practice in prosecution of patent applica-
tions. No reason or warrant exists for limiting application of the doctrine of
equivalents to those comparatively few claims allowed exactly as originally
filed and never amended. Amendments may be of different types and may
serve different functions. Depending on the nature and purpose of an amend-
ment, it may have a limiting effect within a spectrum ranging from great to
small to zero. The effect may or may not be fatal to application of a range of
equivalents broad enough to encompass a particular accused product. It is not
fatal to application of the doctrine itself. 1
In analyzing the claims before it, the court concluded that the amendments
"did not relate to any disclosure 'in the prior art or elsewhere,'" and although
they had some limiting effect, the amendments did not bar the plaintiff's resort
to the doctrine of equivalents.52
The other statement of the narrow application of prosecution history es-
toppel, which is often cited in conjunction with Hughes, is that when consider-
ing the claims in light of the prosecution history:
a close examination must be made as to not only what was surrendered, but
also the reason for such a surrender. The fact that claims were narrowed does
not always mean that the doctrine of file history estoppel completely prohibits
a patentee from recapturing some of what was originally claimed.53
While Hughes clearly mandates determining the limiting effect of the amend-
ments in the context of the prosecution history, the latter statement seems to
go further. The limitation on the scope of the claim will arise through the
literal terms of the amendment. In order to recapture what has been given up,
the court must determine that some of those terms were not necessary to se-
cure claim allowance. This result conflicts with the broad application analysis
which presumes that all elements of an amended claim are material to
allowance. 54
Another example of the narrow application of prosecution history estoppel
is found in Moeller v. lonetics, Inc.55 The alleged infringement was of a patent
for an electrode system used to measure potassium ion cations. The examiner
rejected some of the claims initially filed as obvious in light of prior art. The
applicant amended his claims including, among other things, the statement
49. Id. at 1362.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1363.
52. Id.
53. Bayer Aktiengesellschaft v. Duphar Int'l Research, 738 F.2d 1237, 1243
(Fed. Cir. 1984).
54. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
55. 794 F.2d 653 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The case was heard on appeal from a grant
of a motion for summary judgment by the defendant.
(Vol. 53
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that the invention included an electrode body for supporting the membrane. 6
The examiner found this amendment to be insufficient to distinguish the prior
art. However, the examiner agreed to allow the claim with the inclusion of the
phrase "an electrode disposed in said body."' 57 The stated purpose of the
amendments was to more specifically point out that the invention was not the
ion selecting capability of the membrane, but rather the use of such a mem-
brane in an electrode system.58
In the allegedly infringing electrode system, the electrode 9 protruded
from the electrode body.60 The defendant contended this difference distin-
guished its device from the plaintiff's, in which the electrode was entirely
within the electrode body. Factually, the issue is the same one as in
Kinzenbaw. After the examiner's rejection, the defendant had changed an ele-
ment of his device, which was specifically limited by amendment, in order to
obtain the claim allowance. The court in this instance was willing to determine
the necessity of the language "disposed in said body" to the patentability of
the plaintiff's electrode system. The court concluded that the invention encom-
passed all electrode systems incorporating the ion selecting membrane, which
was the plaintiff's contention.6 The court speculated that:
[p]ossibly, in the examiner's mind, [the language "disposed in said body"]
was needed to exclude potential application of the claim language to read on
future devices that might do the job in a different way, but if it was intended
not to read on such a device as that of [the defendant's], it failed to do so
with any clarity. 2
Moeller adopts the most narrow approach to the application of prosecution
history estoppel suggested in Hughes.6 3 The patentee is allowed to recapture
some of the scope of his claim apparently surrendered during prosecution. This
result stands in clear contrast to the approach taken with broad application
prosecution history estoppel. First, the willingness to conclude that the words
"disposed in said body" were in effect not necessary or material to claim al-
56. Id. at 658. The membrane serves the purpose of selecting the specific posi-
tively charged ions to be measured by the electrode system.
57. Id. at 658-59. The amendment was made by the examiner, not the applicant.
58. Id. at 659.
59. Actually, there was dispute as to how the word "electrode" was used in the
claims. The defendant asserted that "electrode" referred only to the part of the con-
ducting silver wire which protruded from the plastic tube and was covered by the mem-
brane. Plaintiff contended that "electrode" was used alternatively to mean "[tihe entire
system", "[tihe entire length of the electrically conducting wire", and "[tihe tip of the
wire to be immersed into the solution." Id. at 657.
60. Id. The court doubted the reasonableness of the district court's conclusion
that the defendant's device had an electrode which protruded from the body. Id.
61. Id. It should be remembered that on a review of a grant of a motion for
summary judgment, the court weighs the inferences from the facts in favor of the non-
movant. Id. at 656 (citing SRI Int'l v. Matshusita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1116
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc)).
62. Moeller v. Ionetics, Inc., 794 F.2d 653, 659 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
63. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
1988] 505
9
James: James: Patent Claims and Prosecution
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1988
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
lowance rejects the judicial deference rationale underlying broad application
prosecution history estoppel. Second, in Moeller the applicant amended his
claim to avoid prior art, and the accused device differed from the allegedly
infringed device with respect to the amended portion of the claim. However,
those circumstances were not found to bar the plaintiff from using the doctrine
of equivalents.64 This would seem to reject estoppel as a basis for the applica-
tion of prosecution history estoppel.
It is much easier to recognize which principles the narrow application
rejects than it is to recognize those which it embraces. In fact, the answer may
be that it embraces no "principles" at all. The doctrine of equivalents is an
equitable doctrine and as such, it may be argued, exists outside the realm of
well defined rules. Learned Hand, in considering the doctrine of equivalents,
noted that it was a doctrine which fell particularly within the discretion of the
court. "It is," he wrote, "difficult to give [the application of the doctrine of
equivalents in any single case] greater authority than an appeal to the sympa-
thetic understanding of an impartial reader."6 Judge Hand concluded that it
was "impossible" to set conceptual boundaries on the application of the doc-
trine of equivalents when the very nature of the doctrine was to relieve "those
who have failed to express their complete meaning."66 This lack of rules limits
the application of the doctrine of equivalents, belittles the value of precedent
and leaves the court to decide for itself the scope of the doctrine based on the
actual language of the claims, the prior art, and the originality of the inven-
tion.17 Although Judge Hand did not specifically write about prosecution his-
tory estoppel, he clearly favors a narrow application, inasmuch as he rejects a
formalized approach. The Federal Circuit panels in Moeller and Loctite have
given a very similar explanation of their approach to prosecution history estop-
pel.6 8 The court put itself in place of the examiner in concluding that the pat-
ent covered all electrode systems which incorporate a like cation selecting
membrane. The court further assumed such a role in finding that the words
suggested by the examiner himself, that the electrode be disposed in the elec-
trode body, did not carry the limitation on the plaintiff's claim which a literal
reading of those words would suggest.
IV. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The conflict over broad or narrow application of prosecution history estop-
pel in the Federal Circuit could be rendered superfluous by a pronouncement
64. See Moeller v. Ionetics, Inc., 794 F.2d 653, 660 (Fed. Cir. 1986).




68. Moeller v. Ionetics, Inc., 794 F.2d 653, 659 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The court
wrote that the application of prosecution history estoppel must be done on a "case-by-
case basis, guided by equitable and public policy principles.. . ." Id. (quoting Loctite
Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 871 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
[Vol. 53
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from the Supreme Court on the subject. Although the Court has not spoken
for a number of years, it has considered prosecution history estoppel in the
past. In so doing, the Court uniformly agreed that where a claim was amended
as a result of rejection during prosecution, the patentee may not "by resort to
the doctrine of equivalents, to give the claim the larger scope which it might
have had without the amendments . . ."9 This rule of prosecution history
estoppel is a function of the more general rule of claim construction "that the
claim as allowed must be read and interpreted with reference to the rejected
claim and to the prior state of the art, and cannot be so construed as to cover
either what was rejected by the Patent Office or disclosed by prior devices."70
However, as noted above in the Introduction, agreement with the formulation
of the appropriate rule to be applied is of little consequence or aid in determin-
ing how prosecution history estoppel limits the doctrine of equivalents in a
given factual situation.71
Further, the Supreme Court cases fail to distinguish adequately between
prosecution history as a limit of the literal language of the claims and prosecu-
tion history estoppel.7 2 Hubbell v. United States7 ' is illustrative of this failure
in that the bulk of the Court's opinion used the prosecution history to interpret
the language of the claim in question. After concluding the amendments have
so narrowed the claim that the literal language does not encompass the ac-
cused device, 4 the Court summarily refused to apply the doctrine of
equivalents. 5 But this summary dismissal of the doctrine of equivalents should
not be interpreted as necessarily supporting a broad application of prosecution
history estoppel. The interpretation of the literal language of the claim may
pale imperceptibly into a doctrine of equivalents analysis in that the two are
distinguishable as a matter of degree rather than of kind. In this vein, the
69. Weber Elec. Co. v. Freeman Elec. Co., 256 U.S. 668, 677 (1921), accord
Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 136 (1942); Smith v. Magic
City Kennel Club, Inc., 282 U.S. 784, 790 (1931); I.T.S. Rubber Co. v. Essex Rubber
Co., 272 U.S. 429, 444 (1926).
70. Hubbell v. United States, 179 U.S. 77, 80 (1900). The Court also recognized
that the source of these benchmarks of construction was the prosecution history or "file
wrapper" of the claim.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
72. See Smith v. Magic City Kennel Club, 282 U.S. 784 (1931); I.T.S. Rubber
Co. v. Essex Rubber Co., 272 U.S. 429 (1926); Hubbell v. United States, 179 U.S. 77
(1900).
73. Id. at 82.
74. Id. at 83.
75. Id. at 86. The Hubbell Court stated:
Nor can we accept the contention that these two combinations are identical
because they are intended to obtain the same result. What we have to con-
sider is not whether the end sought to be effected is the same, but whether the
devices or mechanical means by which the desired result are secured are the
same.
Id. Needless to say, this apparent reference to the nonapplicability of the doctrine of
equivalents is opaque at best.
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Hubbell Court noted:
[I]t is quite true that, where the difference between the claim as made and as
allowed consist of mere changes of expression, having substantially the same
meaning, such changes, made to meet the views of the examiners, ought not
to be permitted to defeat a meritorious claimant. While not allowed to revive
a rejected claim, by a broad construction of the claim allowed, yet the paten-
tee is entitled to a fair construction of the terms of his claim as actually
granted.78
Thus, the Hubbell Court seems to reject the notion that any amendment to a
claim, regardless of purpose, limits the patentee to only the narrowest interpre-
tation of that claim. Whether this has any bearing on the availability of the
doctrine of equivalents is difficult to determine in light of the rather abortive
discussion of the doctrine of equivalents in the opinion.
The United States Supreme Court's clearest explanation of the interac-
tion between the doctrine of equivalents and prosecution history estoppel is
found in Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp. 7 The case supports the
proposition that an amendment to a claim to avoid a prior art rejection bars
all resort to the doctrine of equivalents.78 But it as well has been cited in
support of the apparently contrary position that an amendment to a claim does
not confine its scope to the specification set out in the application. " The in-
fringement action in Exhibit Supply Co. concerned a patent for a device used
in a pin ball game. The device was a coil spring mounted above the table
which, when struck by the pin ball would flex and contact a conducting annu-
lus embedded in the table, thereby closing a circuit.8 0 During prosecution of
the patent, the patentee amended his claim from the general statement that
the "conductor means" (the annulus) would be "carried by the table" to a
more specific statement that said conductor would be "embedded" in the
table.81
Several devices were at issue in the suit. Two of them replaced the annu-
lus with pins or nails driven into the table but protruding above its surface.82
The Court found these devices to be covered by the patent claims as written,
using the prosecution history to aid in its interpretation of the claim's literal
language.83 The claim could not have been so broad as to include all conductor
76. Id. at 80.
77. 315 U.S. 126 (1942).
78. See Comment, Interplay of Doctrine of Equivalents and File Wrapper Es-
toppel, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 917, 930 (1961).
79. See D. CHISUM, PATENTS § 18.02[3], at 18-18 (1987).
80. Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents, Inc., 315 U.S. 126, 128 (1942).
81. Id. at 132.
82. Id. at 134.
83. The dictionary definition of "embedded" did not suggest that the conductor
means had to be located entirely between the upper and lower surface of the table.
However, the Court also looked at the specifications, drawings and statements by the
examiner which confirmed that patentee had not chosen other than the normal mean-
ing of embedded. Id. at 135. The patentee is free to give words in his patent the mean-
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means carried by the table, but did include conductor means embedded in the
table.814 The Court found that the accused device was covered without reaching
beyond the literal language of the claim.85 It did not touch upon the doctrine
of equivalents or prosecution history estoppel in making this determination.
In the other four accused devices the conductor was not embedded in the
table, but either supported by a plate resting on the table or by a standard
which also supported the coil spring.86 Finding no literal infringement, the
Court refused the plaintiff's invitation to find infringement by the doctrine of
equivalents. The Court stated that the patentee had by his amendment dis-
claimed the difference between conductors "carried by the table" and those
"embedded in the table."87 The disclaimer "must be regarded as material, and
... strictly construed against him."88 Therefore, the Court limited the patent
claim to cover only a "conductor means, which although carried by the table,
is also embedded in it."89 The patentee was not allowed to regain what he
disclaimed "by recourse to the doctrine of equivalents." 90 The Supreme Court,
therefore, appears to have embraced the broad application of prosecution his-
tory estoppel in that it refused to determine whether the amended claim has
any range of equivalents.
On the other hand, the Court did not thoroughly analyze prosecution his-
tory estoppel. Further, as is shown in the examiner's objection,9' the patent
was granted on a fairly narrow distinction of prior art, implying that the range
of equivalents for this invention was small or nonexistent. Unfortunately, then,
a definitive answer as to the proper application of prosecution history estoppel
cannot be found in the opinions of the Supreme Court.
V. BROAD V. NARROW
While the preceding sections considered the broad and narrow application of
prosecution history estoppel individually, a clearer understanding of the doc-
trines is found in their juxtaposition. Two cases aptly suited for such compari-
son are Hughes and Kinzenbaw. Chief Judge Markey of the Federal Circuit
wrote the majority opinion in both. These cases seem to be the foundations for
ing he wishes to give them. Autogiro Co. v. United States, 181 Ct. Cl. 55, 62, 384 F.2d
391, 397 (1967).
84. Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents, Inc., 315 U.S. 126, 135 (1942).
85. Although the drawings showed the conductor to be an annulus, the Court did
not go beyond the language of the claims to find the pins and nails used in the accused
device fell within the scope of the invention. The claim language was for a "conductor
means" and not the specific conductor, the annulus, shown in the drawings.
86. Id. at 130-31. Interestingly, the defendant urged the Court to discard the
doctrine of equivalents as inconsistent with the statutory rule that the claim shall de-
scribe the invention. The Court did not reach this conclusion. Id. at 136.
87. Id. at 137.
88. Id. (citations omitted).
89. Id. at 136.
90. Id. at 137.
91. Id. at 133.
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the divergent approaches to prosecution history estoppel espoused by different
panels of the Federal Circuit.92 The panel in Kinzenbaw, which was the later
of the two opinions, did not consider themselves in conflict with the Hughes
decision. In fact, the court cited Hughes as support for the patentee's conten-
tion that the limitation placed upon the invention by claim amendment, upon
which the defendant sought to distinguish his device, "was unnecessary to
avoid prior art."'93 In spite of evidence that the particular amendment was
"irrelevant" to the allowance of the claim,94 the Kinzenbaw court did not ex-
plain its view of the Hughes holding nor distinguish it.
It is possible to see Hughes and Kinzenbaw as consistent applications of
prosecution history estoppel. The rule of Hughes was that amendments to
claims have a different limiting effect depending upon their "nature and pur-
pose." 95 Applying this rule, the Hughes court found that the patentee's
"amendment of claims did not relate to any disclosure in the prior art," of
devices having elements like those in the accused device.99 The amendment
made it clear that the applicant was not claiming "all structures in which a
pulsed jet is used to precess the spin axis [of the space vehicle] ."9 The paten-
tee's point of novelty related to the apparatus for indicating the position of the
vehicle with respect to a fixed external coordinate system99 and the relay of
that information to Earth for ground controlled position correction. The
amendment served to distinguish patentee's invention not by degree, but in
kind. Therefore, the prior art reference did not serve to limit the scope of the
patentee's amended claims.99
The facts of Kinzenbaw presented a very different situation. The claim
was amended to avoid a prior art reference relating to gauge wheels. 100 The
element of the defendant's device which was allegedly equivalent, and thus
infringing, was the gauge wheel. Accordingly, the limiting effect of the amend-
ment was considerable.101 In contrast to the situation in Hughes, the paten-
92. See the discussion of the cases in Moeller v. Ionetics, Inc., 794 F.2d 653, 659
(Fed. Cir. 1986); Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 871 (Fed. Cir. 1985);
Strawbridge, McDonald & Moy, supra note 26, at 887-89.
93. Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 389 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
94. Id.
95. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1362. This type of device was well disclosed in the prior art, and the
patentee was barred by prosecution history estoppel from making any claims to such a
device. Id.
98. See id. at 1356.
99. "[The patentee's] amendment of the claims did not relate to any disclosure
in the prior art or elsewhere, in which ISA position was stored in a computer along
with command signals for later execution." Id. at 1363.
100. Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 388 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
101. The reader should note that the plaintiff's patent was in a "crowded art."
Id. at 389. The range of equivalents for a patent claim in a crowded art is very limited,
even if the claim had never been amended or in any other way narrowed, because there
are so many other claims in the same area that the patentee's claim's validity rests on a
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tee's invention was part of a crowded art. The patentability of the device
rested upon a narrow distinction which was the amendment emphasized so as
to avoid rejection. The large number of similar devices previously disclosed in
the art prompted the court's determination, without reference to the prosecu-
tion history, that the range of equivalents was small or nonexistent. Given the
nature and purpose of the amendment was to avoid a prior art reference in a
crowded field, the Hughes court agreed that the limiting effect of the amend-
ment was so great as to confine the scope of the claim to its literal terms.
The Kinzenbaw court refused to determine whether the limitation made
in response to the examiner's rejection was necessary to distinguish the prior
art. This refusal does not place the Kinzenbaw decision at odds with Hughes.
Hughes contemplates defining an amended claim's range of equivalents in
light of purposes and prior art references cited in the prosecution history. This
is quite different from the evaluation of whether an amendment's particular
limitation was necessary to overcome the examiner's rejection, as in
Kinzenbaw. The former is a matter of interpretation which is clearly within a
court's expertise, while the latter falls within the expertise of the applicant and
the patent examiner. Kinzenbaw, then, does not stand for the proposition that
any limiting amendment to a claim bars resort to the doctrine of equivalents.
Hughes, at least upon its facts, does not stand for the proposition that the
court may re-evaluate whether a particular limitation was necessary for the
claim to be allowed.' 0 2 Hughes and Kinzenbaw do not espouse a single coher-
ent approach to prosecution history estoppel. However, they should not be
looked upon as the respective bases for divergent schools of thought as to pros-
ecution history estoppel.
The Federal Circuit has compared Hughes and Kinzenbaw. In Loctite
Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd.,10 3 the court embraced the narrow application ap-
proach it found in Hughes and Bayer Aktiengesellschaft v. Duphar Interna-
tional Research.'" In a footnote, the court mentioned Kinzenbaw. Judge Bald-
win wrote:
the court was unwilling under the facts there presented to "undertake the
speculative inquiry" as to the necessity of certain claim amendments and oth-
erwise to enlarge the literal scope of patent claims amended during prosecu-
tion. The results reached there only highlight that application of prosecution
history estoppel to limit the doctrine of equivalents should be performed as a
legal matter on a case-by-case basis guided by equitable and public policy
rather small distinction. The import of a crowded art to the application of prosecution
history estoppel is that it is far less likely that any limiting amendment could have only
a small effect on the range of equivalents included within the scope of the claim. In
fact, any amendment would almost certainly preclude the existence of any equivalents.
102. But see supra text accompanying notes 53-54.
103. 781 F.2d 861 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
104. Id. at 871.
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principles underlying the doctrines involved by the facts of the particular
case.'
05
The Federal Circuit's loose approach to the application of prosecution history
estoppel, to the surprise of no one, has been criticized. 106 It is easy to be criti-
cal of the off-handed treatment which prosecution history estoppel received in
Loctite. The court suggested that in some factual situations, such as in
Kinzenbaw, it is acceptable to apply the more formal approach of broad appli-
cation history estoppel while in others there can be no formal approach. The
Moeller court was quite right to recognize this inconsistency and conclude that
Loctite limited Kinzenbaw to its facts.10 7 However, the fact intensive and pol-
icy oriented approach deemed appropriate by the Loctite court is consistent
with the Learned Hand's analysis (discussed previously) of the narrow appli-
cation prosecution history estoppel. 08 Nevertheless, this approach lacks any
discussion of the competing principles suggested in support of broad applica-
tion. Most importantly, it fails to answer why such a vague treatment of prose-
cution history estoppel should be adopted in light of the tension between the
doctrine of equivalents and the rule that the claims define the scope of the
patent.
The springboard for the Federal Circuit's dive into the precedential void
of public policy and equity on a case-by-case basis was, in part at least, that
broad application prosecution history estoppel was too "wooden."' 09 One such
ostensibly wooden case was Nationwide Chemical Corp. v. Wright."0 Yet Na-
tionwide recognized limitations to the general rule of literal interpretation of
the language of claims amended to avoid rejection. One such limitation posited
that "an applicant should not be presumed to have made a disclaimer broader
than necessary to yield to the actual challenge to his claim.""' The court
stated that this exception applies" 2 where "the limitation in the claim was not
105. Id. at n.7 (emphasis added).
106. See Strawbridge, McDonald & Moy, supra note 26, at 888 ("The Federal
Circuit's ... statements that it will be guided in [the area of prosecution history estop-
pel] by equitable and public policy principles and the facts of the case are so broad and
diffuse that they are essentially useless as precedent.").
107. Moeller v. Ionetics, Inc., 794 F.2d 653, 659 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 65-67.
109. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
110. 584 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1978).
Ill. Id. at 718 (quoting Ziegler v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 483 F.2d 858, 871
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1079 (1973)); see also Hunt Tool Co. v. Lawrence,
242 F.2d 347, 354 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 910 (1957).
112. In addition to this situation, the court held that the exception should apply
when the dimension or dosage element of the allegedly infringing device "falls on the
other side of the patent in suit from the prior art." Nationwide Chem. Corp. v. Wright,
584 F.2d 714, 719 (5th Cir. 1978). For instance, if the prior art specified a dosage of
48 ounces of a certain chemical and the patented method had amended its claim to
stipulate two to four ounces, a product calling for one ounce of the chemical could fall
within the range of equivalents still available to the claim. However, if the allegedly
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inserted to overcome any prior art."' 13 Albeit in a minor way, the court in
Nationwide recognized the Hughes admonition that amendments have differ-
ing purposes and therefore the limiting effect of any particular amendment
may be difficult to ascertain.2"' To be certain, Nationwide tightly reigns in this
exception to prosecution history estoppel. So long as the amendment was nec-
essary to avoid prior art, the court looks no further before applying prosecu-
tion history estoppel to bar patentee's assertion of equivalence." 5 However, it
is conceivable the Nationwide court could have reached the same result in
Hughes as did the Federal Circuit. The amendments in Hughes were not for
the purpose of overcoming prior art."x6
Comparing cases espousing broad application prosecution history estoppel
with those adopting a narrow application gives rise to several observations.
First, the distinction between the approaches, as it has developed in the Fed-
eral Circuit, is based, at least in part, on the false assumption that Hughes
and Kinzenbaw are irreconcilable. The Federal Circuit has failed to ade-
quately discuss the underlying policies and principles which compel it to adopt
a narrow application approach to prosecution history estoppel. The only reason
the Circuit articulates appears to be that the broad application approach is too
wooden and therefore too unfair. However, the broad application approach is
not as wooden as it appears, and is supported by policy and principles of its
own. Courts should consider more fully the competing policies and principles
before, as apparently done in Moeller and Loctite, concluding that no criteria
for the application of prosecution history estoppel can be defined.
VI. LEGAL AND EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES
To some extent, the lack of consistent application of prosecution history
estoppel has been a failure to find or to agree upon the legal and equitable
principles served by prosecution history estoppel. Federal Circuit panels in
Kinzenbaw and Prodyne Enterprises, Inc. v. Julie Pomerantz, Inc."' sug-
gested that, as the name indicates, prosecution history estoppel is an estoppel
infringing product called for a dosage of five ounces it would not be in the scope of the
equivalents of that claim. See id. at 719. This presumption or exception to the rule that
a limiting amendment bars resort to the doctrine of equivalents is arbitrary and
wooden. No sound reason is given for distinguishing between equivalents on one end of
a range from equivalents on the other end simply because they more closely approxi-
mate or approach the prior art.
113. Id.
114. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1363 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
115. "Since [the plaintiff] was forced to introduce some dosage restriction ...
we look no further and hold [the plaintiff] 'strictly to the letter of the claims granted'
to it." Nationwide Chem. Corp. v. Wright, 584 F.2d 714, 719 (5th Cir. 1978) (quoting
Ekco Prods. Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 347 F.2d 453, 455 (7th Cir. 1965)).
116. See supra text accompanying notes 97-99.
117. 743 F.2d 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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concept.1 ' There are several difficulties with this approach. Traditional estop-
pel contemplates reliance to one's detriment on the words or acts of one's ad-
versary."19 Indeed, in the average infringement case, it is unlikely that the
alleged infringer actually searched the prosecution history and was misled by
the patentee's representations.'20
In a situation like that in Kinzenbaw, there may have been reliance on the
prosecution history, in that the infringer had been seeking ways to avoid the
patent held by the plaintiff."' However, to predicate the imposition of prose-
cution history estoppel on the alleged infringer's belief that some aspect of the
claim had been surrendered during prosecution allows potential infringers to
define the scope of patent claims. Such scopes are more appropriately defined
by the language of the claims, and by judicial interpretation of them through
the doctrine of equivalents. Further, prosecution history estoppel is unlike
traditional estoppel in that it is not an affirmative defense and may be raised
for the first time on appeal."'
Another common legal basis for prosecution history estoppel is abandon-
ment. The Supreme Court has explained prosecution history estoppel in terms
of what the patentee abandoned or disclaimed during prosecution.'" Aban-
donment implies that the patentee intentionally relinquished a particular
equivalent or range of equivalents." 4 However, the patentee cannot have in-
tentionally abandoned an equivalent of which he, by definition of the doctrine
of equivalents, was unaware when he wrote the patent claim. Abandonment,
then, is a poor basis for prosecution history estoppel.
Chisum has suggested that prosecution history estoppel is an exhaustion
of administrative remedies concept, and therefore the "appropriate inquiry is
whether the [prosecution history] reveals a construction of the claim in ques-
tion held mutually by the patent examiner and the applicant which is at vari-
ance with the construction currently relied upon by the patent owner." 1 5 This
118. See supra notes 38-44.
119. Dvorak, That Perplexing Problem - The Doctrine of File Wrapper Estop-
pel, 50 J. PAT. OFF. SoC'Y 143, 144 (1968).
120. Id. "It is particularly difficult to picture the large number of alleged infring-
ers sifting through the patent office files and being misled by applicants' statements
contained in those records. How much easier it is to conceive of these persons unknow-
ingly producing an allegedly infringing device or using their ingenuity to remain
outside the scope of the patent claims." Id.
121. See Kinzenbaw v. Deere & Co., 741 F.2d 383, 385-86 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Kinze Manufacturing Co. had purchased Deere's patented row planter, the subject of
this suit, attached its own tool bar and then sold the combination as a unit. Kinze had
considerable difficulty in getting Deere to supply enough row planters, although it had
already been to court once over the matter.
122. 4 D. CHisuM, PATENTS § 18.05[1] (1987).
123. Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 136-37 (1942).
124. See Dvorak, supra note 119, at 145-46.
125. 4 D. CHISUM, PATENTS § 18.05[1] (1987) (footnote omitted); see General
Instrument Corp. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 399 F.2d 373, 385 (1st Cir. 1968). Prosecu-
tion history estoppel is a tool of interpretation rather than a defense.
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is appealing in that it focuses the court on the prosecution record rather than
on an independent conclusion as to the scope of the invention. Such a focus
allows the patent examiner, in conjunction with the applicant, to define the
invention and it leaves the court to interpret what has been granted with the
aid of the prosecution history. The problem with the inquiry is that the doc-
trine of equivalents comes into play when the applicant and examiner failed to
anticipate the equivalent device or process. It is unrealistic to assume that the
applicant and examiner had agreed upon a construction of the claim which
would specifically exclude the equivalent in question. Had such a mutually
held construction been in existence, it would have been part of the literal lan-
guage of the claim. Thus, Chisum probably is suggesting a narrow application
of prosecution history estoppel. The doctrine of equivalents is, under this ap-
proach, limited by prosecution history estoppel only when the record reveals
that the applicant and examiner had affirmatively excluded a particular
equivalent of the final claim. Presumably if the prosecution history is inconclu-
sive, the finding of equivalency would stand.
In an article written twenty years ago, Dvorak reiterated that a funda-
mental basis of patent law is that the patentee is entitled to protection for
what he has invented and nothing else. Prosecution history estoppel is merely a
manifestation of this fundamental rule.126 The court must look, according to
Dvorak, for the limitations which were placed on "essential technical terms
used in the patent claims." 2 An essential technical term in a claim is one
which defines the "essence" of the invention. 2 ' Clearly this approach invites
the court to determine whether a particular amendment was necessary to the
invention, which the court refused to do in Kinzenbaw. 2 9
One rationale for the formal approach of broad application prosecution
history estoppel is judicial deference. 30 This rationale is relied upon in cases
where the court refuses to speculate as to whether all the terms of the amend-
ment to a claim were necessary for allowance. Any time a court applies the
doctrine of equivalents it implicitly concludes that the relevant terms of the
claim were not, at least as to their literal meaning, necessary to claim allow-
ance. Unless there is a reason for applying judicial deference when a claim has
been amended and for failing to do so when there has been no amendment, the
judicial deference rationale is hopelessly inconsistent. When a claim has been
amended to avoid a rejection based on prior art, and especially where there
have been repeated rejections and amendments, the court can be reasonably
certain that the applicant and the patent examiner have focused their atten-
tion upon the terms of the amendment and are unlikely to have inadvertently
made the claim too narrow. Such certainty further accords with the conflict
between the rule that the claims define the scope of the invention and the
126. See Dvorak, supra note 119, at 150.
127. Dvorak, supra note 119, at 148 (emphasis in original).
128. Id.
129. See supra text accompanying note 34.
130. See supra text accompanying note 46.
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doctrine of equivalents. In addition, the conflict suggests that where the appli-
cation of the doctrine of equivalents is dubious, such doubt should serve to
limit the doctrine's use.
The tension between the language of the claims and the doctrine of
equivalents also provides a partial explanation to Learned Hand's reasoning in
adopting a no rules approach to the doctrine of equivalents. 131 Hand's logic is
compelling because the experts (the applicant and the examiner) who could
have made their meaning clear had they anticipated the alleged equivalent,
failed to do so. Therefore, there are no definable criteria for limiting the doc-
trine of equivalents in any formal way. But, the answer to Hand's argument
lies in the inconsistency of the co-existence of the doctrine of equivalents with
the rule that the claims define the invention. This inconsistency demands that
any reasonable basis for limiting the doctrine of equivalents should be given a
regular effect. Such a basis could be, as discussed above, that the amendment
of the claim shows that the applicant and examiner have given special consid-
eration as to what terms are necessary to secure claim allowance. In the fu-
ture, the Federal Circuit in endeavoring to articulate a single coherent ap-
proach to prosecution history estoppel as it limits the doctrine of equivalents,
should realize that any approach announced must balance between protecting
a patentee's inventions on one side and the danger of extending that protection
beyond the literal language the claims employ to define the invention on the
other.
VII. CONCLUSION
In defining criteria for the application of prosecution history estoppel it
should be remembered, if not necessarily in such Posnerian terms, that to
some extent, the certainty of the law bears an inverse relationship to the de-
gree to which equitable principles are involved. The doctrine of equivalents is
an equitable doctrine and as such cannot be pinned to well defined rules. On
the other hand, there are guidelines to limit the effect of prosecution history
estoppel.
First, estoppel should be completely rejected as a basis for prosecution
history estoppel. It does not adequately embody the relevant principles. The
fundamental policy behind prosecution history estoppel is that the patentee
receives protection for that which he has invented and disclosed in his patent,
and nothing more. The fact that the alleged infringer may have been led to
believe that some particular item was excluded from the claim cannot bar the
patentee from receiving this protection. Clearly, public interest favors both the
protection of inventions and free access to devices or processes in the public
domain. Estoppel does not provide a useful vehicle for implementing these
interests.
Second, the language of claims should be given the fullest meaning al-
131. See supra text accompanying notes 65-67.
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lowed by the prior art and limitations in the prosecution history. A rule that
claims define the scope of the invention is not well served by summarily impos-
ing a strict construction rule on any amended claim. An expansive reading of
the terms of the claim does not run afoul, as does the doctrine of equivalents,
of the rule that the claims define the scope of the invention. The court, then,
should favor such expansive reading and be slow to reach the docirine of
equivalents analysis.
After broad construction and examination of the prosecution history, if
the claims still do not cover the allegedly infringing device, the court should
turn to the doctrine of equivalents. This necessarily implies that the court con-
sider application of prosecution history estoppel. In claim interpretation the
rules of construction attempt to implement the fundamental principle that the
patentee receives protection for only what he has invented. Therefore, the
equivalents of a claim cannot include material which falls within the scope of
the prior art or equivalents of the prior art, nor may equivalents recapture
claims surrendered by amendments in response to rejections. 132 Prosecution
history estoppel can aid the court in determining whether a given equivalent
falls within one of these three proscribed area. During the prosecution process,
through the rejection and amendment of claims, the applicant and examiner
ascertain what is covered by prior art or its equivalents. Courts are, or should
be, reluctant to second guess these determinations through court-made doc-
trine. Thus, the process of prosecuting a patent claim, which is reflected in the
prosecution history, serves not only to define the invention but also to guide
and restrain court in thier use of the doctrine of equivalents. Such restraints
will ensure that courts do not institute independent patent claim procedures.
But it does not follow that a court should, upon finding a claim to have
been amended, abandon the doctrine of equivalents. The Hughes court was
correct in rejecting such an approach, especially given that the rejection of an
applicant's initial claims is almost certain. 33 The court should investigate, by
use of the prosecution history, the "nature and purpose" of the amendment
before it determines whether prosecution history estoppel applies. The most
important determination is whether the amendment was a result of a rejection
based on a prior art reference.1'3 An amendment for any other purpose should
have no effect.' 35 If the court is fortunate, the prosecution history may reveal
that the patentee and examiner agreed on a construction of the claim which is
at odds with the one he now puts forward . 36 Clearly, such a situation would
132. Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents, Inc., 315 U.S. 126, 136 (1942); Parme-
lee Pharmaceutical Co. v. Zink, 285 F.2d 465, 472 (8th Cir. 1961). This view has been
rejected by the Federal Circuit in Hughes and Moeller. See supra text accompanying
notes 53-54, 62-64.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 49-52.
134. This would be a rejection for anticipation or obviousness.
135. See Coulter Elec. v. J.T. Baker Chem. Co., 487 F. Supp. 1172, 1175 (N.D.
Ill. 1980) (cites numerous other authorities for this proposition).
136. See supra text accompanying note 125.
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provide a proper occasion for the application of prosecution history estoppel.
The "invention population" within the art of the patentee's invention also
has bearing on the application of prosecution history estoppel. 117 This consid-
eration's usefulness is not found in bringing to light exactly what has been
invented but rather is found in the realization that if the art is crowded, the
likelihood of existing equivalents uncovered by prior art is minimal. However,
the crowded art/pioneer art distinction is only useful in claim interpretation
when the prosecution history clearly reveals extreme conditions are present in
the particular art.
In the final analysis, the words of the claim should be given their fullest
meaning within the limitations in the prosecution history. If the claim has
been amended several times, each time due to rejections based on prior art,
prosecution history estoppel should be applied so as to bar the doctrine of
equivalents. In such a situation it is unlikely that the patentee and examiner
failed to consider an equivalent. Where the relevant art is crowded, this result
is even more appropriate. While this approach leaves grey areas of court dis-
cretion, such discretion will allow courts to deal with unanticipated factual
situations while still honoring the principles which call for application of pros-
ecution history estoppel.
KURT F. JAMES
137. See supra text following note 101.
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